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Quarterly Economic Commentary 
ECONOMIC 
Perspective 
MONITORING THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS 
OF THE DEVOLUTION SETTLEMENT: 
ISSUES AND DATA REQUIREMENTS 
by James Cuthbert and Margaret Cuthbert 
INTRODUCTION 
The subject of this paper is the requirement to 
monitor the financial aspects of the Scottish 
devolution settlement. Financial aspects will, 
almost inevitably, underpin the success or failure 
of devolution. The precise issues involved, and the 
question of the data requirements for monitoring 
these issues, are topics which so far have attracted 
relatively little attention. 
The Scottish Parliament needs to understand fully 
how the major component of the Scottish Budget, 
the Departmental Expenditure Limit (DEL), is 
derived by the ongoing application of the Barnett 
formula. We argue in this paper that the Scottish 
Parliament will also need to be able to: 
(a) check whether certain key implicit 
assumptions underlying the devolution 
settlement continue to hold through time 
(b) ensure that there is proper articulation 
between devolved and non-devolved 
services 
(c ) ensure that Scotland is getting adequate 
"value for money" from the various 
categories of non-devolved expenditure, 
and also from European funding. 
For this, extensive data will be needed - relatively 
little of which is currently readily available. The 
paper examines these data requirements. 
The primary concern of the paper is with the issues 
involved in monitoring the current devolution 
settlement: that is, with those issues which will 
have to be tackled if devolution as it is currently 
structured is to be made to work satisfactorily. 
There are, in addition, a number of wider issues 
which will inevitably become the focus of intense 
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debate in the medium term, if not sooner, and on 
which improved data will be required. 
These issues include the assessment of relative 
spending need between Scotland and England, and 
estimation of Scotland's macro-economic 
aggregates. 
The final section of the paper considers these wider 
issues. 
MONITORING THE OPERATION OF THE 
SCOTTISH BUDGET 
The Scottish Budget represents the resources 
directly within the control of the Scottish 
Parliament, together with certain resources 
administered by the Scottish Executive, as in the 
case of CAP. The Budget for 1998-99 is shown 
below: 
Total Budget 
1998-99 
Departmental 
Expenditure Limit 
Annually Managed 
Expenditure 
Common Agricultural 
Policy 
NHS and teachers' 
pensions 
Housing Support Grant 
Other 
New Deal for Schools 
Non-Domestic Rates 
Total Budget 
1998-99 
Estimated 
Outturn 
Imillion cash 
13,282 
345 
348 
13 
27 
1,395 
15,410 
Source: Serving Scotland's Needs, 1999 
The DEL is that part of the Budget which is 
determined on a three year planning horizon. 
Annually Managed Expenditure represents items of 
spending that, to quote from Serving Scotland's 
Needs "cannot be reasonably subject to firm three 
year limits or that should have special control 
regimes". AME items are reviewed as part of the 
annual budget process. 
The "Other" category includes miscellaneous 
sources of finance, which fall outwith the 
mechanisms determining DEL and AME. In 
particular, the New Deal for Schools is financed by 
the Windfall Tax. As regards Non Domestic Rates, 
the rate poundage is within the direct control of the 
Scottish Parliament, but the overall yield of the tax 
depends not just on the poundage but on the tax 
base. Also included in the "Other" category, would 
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be revenue generated from the income tax varying 
powers of the Scottish Parliament if it were to 
choose to exercise these powers. 
Changes to the DEL are related to changes in 
individual English, (or England and Wales) 
expenditure programmes through a mechanism 
called the Barnett formula which works as follows. 
If there is a per capita money change on spending 
on an English programme, assuming that this 
service relates to a programme which is devolved 
in Scotland, then the Scottish DEL is adjusted by 
the same amount per capita. If spending on a given 
service goes up by £2 per capita in England, then 
this results in a £2 per head adjustment to the 
Scottish DEL. The final change to the Scottish 
DEL is the sum of all such changes generated by 
relevant English programmes. What results from 
Bamett is an overall change to the DEL: it is up to 
the Scottish Executive to decide how the DEL 
should be allocated between programmes in 
Scotland. Note also that, since current levels of 
public expenditure per head are higher in Scotland 
than in England, an equal per capita increase in 
money terms in both countries means that the 
percentage increase in Scotland is lower. If public 
expenditure is rising overall in money terms, then 
the Barnett formula will force per capita spending 
levels in Scotland to converge eventually with 
those in England. As can be seen from the above 
table, Barnett governs 86% of expenditure in the 
Scottish Budget. 
The following three points are relevant: 
(a) The Scottish Budget represents the 
primary source of finance for devolved 
services but not the totality of expenditure 
on these services. In particular, as regards 
local authority services, the Scottish 
Budget funds grants from central 
government to local authorities: local 
authorities also finance some of their own 
expenditure through council tax, to the 
order of about £1 billion per annum. So, 
as regards the different devolved services, 
some (like health), are funded directly and 
almost entirely from the Scottish Budget: 
but others, like school education, are 
funded partly from the grants paid to local 
authorities out of the Scottish budget and 
partly by council tax. 
(b) As far as the Scottish Parliament is 
concerned, the bulk of the resources 
within the Scottish Budget, (the 91% of 
the budget represented by DEL, AME, 
and New Deal), are externally determined, 
through the operation of the budgetary 
process in Whitehall. The only way in 
which the Scottish Parliament can 
influence the size of the Scottish budget is 
through decisions on non-domestic rates, 
or if it were to use its income tax varying 
power. 
(c) The expenditure programmes to which 
Bamett applies are net of fees and 
charges, that is, net of any income raised 
by charges for public services. 
Against this background, what are the key issues 
for monitoring the Scottish Budget and the 
resulting information requirements? 
The first issue concerns the operation of the Barnett 
formula itself. Full information needs to be 
published, giving the detail of the calculations 
showing how the Bamett principle translates into 
the actual cash change in the Scottish DEL each 
year. 
Possibly the best justification for publishing such 
full detail is to consider the limited information on 
the operation of Barnett which has been available 
to date: and the consequences of this lack of 
information. The Bamett formula was introduced 
in 1979, and the basic principles of Bamett have 
remained unchanged ever since. However, the 
required information to enable the Barnett 
calculations to be replicated each year was never 
published: it is also now clear, as noted in the 
Treasury Supplementary Memorandum to the 
Treasury Committee, December 1997, that the 
application of the Bamett principle was fairly 
loose, at least until the early 1990s. The result was 
that, far from converging with English per capita 
spending levels, Scotland's relatively favourable 
spending levels were maintained, or even improved 
over this period. This led to the development of a 
wide spread myth, current even to this day, that 
Barnett is "good" because it protects Scotland's 
favourable spending position. Such myths are die 
direct result of lack of information: the best way to 
dispel myths, and to prevent new, equally 
damaging myuis arising, is to ensure that the full 
detail of the Barnett calculations is published each 
year. 
Specifically, data are required on the planned 
increase in expenditure in England, or England and 
Wales, for each of the different categories which 
feed into the Bamett formula. This should be 
presented not just in terms of the change in the 
planned spend for each year, but in terms of the 
"old plan" and "new plan" for each year, so that 
change can be determined in absolute and 
percentage terms. At present, while the government 
has published details of the percentages of each of 
the detailed English programmes to which Barnett 
will apply, it does not publish a sister volume of 
the relevant expenditure plans in the same detail, so 
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it is not possible to recreate the Bamett calculations 
from publicly available information. It will also be 
necessary to have information on the reasons for 
the planned increases. This is not to imply that the 
Scottish Executive will either wish, or indeed be 
able, to shadow English spending decisions: but, 
decisions taken in England, for example major pay 
awards, are likely to constrain the freedom of 
action of the Scottish Executive, so it is important 
that the Scottish Executive is aware of the detail of 
such constraints. 
We now turn to the second monitoring issue. 
Almost 91% of the resources in the Scottish Budget 
are externally determined by the DEL and AME. 
There are, however, significant other resources 
inside and outside the budget, which also 
contribute to service provision. These include non-
domestic rates, (which is within the budget), 
council tax, and income from fees and charges. 
Both of the latter elements fall outside the budget: 
council tax because it contributes to local 
authorities' self-financed expenditure, and fees and 
charges because the expenditure aggregates on 
which Barnett is based are calculated net of fees 
and charges. As a shorthand we describe these 
three elements as "own resources" elements 
because the amount of funding provided by the 
three mechanisms is, in part at least, dependent on 
decisions on poundages or charges which are taken 
within Scotland. 
At first sight, it might appear that, since these "own 
resources" elements are dependent on local 
decisions, there is little requirement to monitor 
these elements in detail: and, in particular, little 
requirement for comparative monitoring 
information with England. There are two reasons 
why this is not the case: -
(a) the size of the "own resources" elements 
does not depend simply on local decisions 
about poundages or charges: it also 
depends on the size of the relative tax 
bases for council tax and non-domestic 
rates, and on the number of people using 
the services for which there are fees and 
charges. 
(b) if the current devolution financial 
settlement is regarded as "fair", then this 
must involve some implicit judgement 
that the current relative availability of 
"own resources" in Scotland and England 
is fair also. Radical changes in the relative 
availability of "own resources" between 
the two countries would then call into 
question the continuing fairness of the 
overall settlement. 
To give an example, suppose that the tax base for 
council tax was growing relatively faster in 
England than in Scotland. In other words, suppose 
that the tax base per head, in terms of band E 
equivalents, was growing faster in England: then 
for a given level of council tax, through time 
England would be able to provide either a higher 
level of local authority services for the same level 
of central government grants to local authorities, or 
the same level of services with a reduced 
government grant. In either case, the relative level 
of public expenditure per head in Scotland would 
change, (or Scotland would have to raise council 
tax to compensate), over and above the planned 
change in relative public expenditure resulting 
from Bamett. Clearly, if such a process were at 
work, it would be important to be able to detect it 
in good time, so that an informed judgement could 
be made, between Westminster and Holyrood, as to 
whether any compensating adjustment to the 
Bamett formula was required. 
This is not to argue that compensating adjustments 
to the funding package should be made 
automatically in the light of changes to the "own 
resources" bases. It could well be the case, for 
example, that it was desirable to maintain an 
incentive element, so that either country could be 
rewarded for taking successful steps to grow its 
"own resources" - or penalised for adverse policies 
that harm resources. The important point, however, 
is that such decisions should be confronted 
explicitly and in good time - rather than be taken 
by default. This can only be done if comparative 
monitoring information on the "own resources" 
elements is available for both Scotland and 
England. 
For council tax and non-domestic rates, the 
monitoring information which is required are data 
on the size of the tax bases, and the poundage or 
equivalent for both Scotland and England. For fees 
and charges, what is required is information on the 
revenue raised by fees and charges for each of the 
major services, for example Education, Leisure and 
Recreation, etc., in Scotland and England. In 
principle, it would also be desirable to have 
information available on the average levels of fees 
and charges for the major services in the two 
countries. For example, if total revenue from fees 
and charges rises in England due to a doubling of 
fees and charges men there is littie argument for 
adjusting the funding formula to compensate 
Scotland: if revenue from fees and charges in 
England has risen due to a rise in the numbers 
using services then there is possibly a case for 
adjusting the funding mechanism. In practice this 
data will be difficult to gather in readily 
interpretable form and sample survey work is likely 
to be a route forward. 
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We have looked at the requirement to monitor the 
different funding resources for the provision of 
public services. In fact, similar principles also arise 
if there were to be a marked shift in the balance of 
provision between public and private sector in 
either Scotland or England. For example, if the 
proportion of education in England provided by the 
private sector were to increase for whatever reason, 
with a corresponding reduction in the public 
expenditure programme then the straight 
application of the Barnett formula would result in a 
lower Scottish DEL. This would require either 
Scotland to follow a similar route as regards the 
provision of education, or to seek cuts in other 
public services. Rather than be imposed 
automatically, the case for adjustment in the 
funding formula should be explicitly addressed in 
such circumstances. There is also a need, therefore, 
to monitor trends in the split of service provision 
between public and private sectors. 
This latter point is an example of the type of 
problem which could arise if aspirations for the 
provision of public services were to diverge 
radically between Scotland and England. The 
paradox of devolution is that it provides the 
political means for such divergent aspirations to be 
satisfied, without providing the financial means. 
Yet it is almost inconceivable that substantially 
different aspirations could be accommodated 
without there being financial implications. Further, 
differences can occur due to changed aspirations in 
either country: aspirations in England may as 
readily drift away from today's status quo as those 
in Scotland. Were the change to occur in England, 
there is then a real issue as to whether Scotland 
should be dragged along in the resulting financial 
implications simply by the operation of a 
mathematical formula. 
The overall thrust of the arguments in this section 
is that the operation of the funding package for the 
Scottish Parliament needs to be monitored in a 
holistic way. There are a number of assumptions 
which must hold through time if the settlement is to 
be regarded as fair. There is no reason why these 
implicit assumptions should continue to hold in the 
longer term. The important point is that relevant 
information should be available so that such 
changes can be detected in good time, and so that 
the question of whether to make an adjustment to 
the devolution funding package can be explicitly 
addressed. 
MONITORING EXPENDITURE OUTSIDE 
THE SCOTTISH BUDGET 
In its report, "Government Expenditure and 
Revenue in Scotland", (GERS), November 1998, 
the government attributed around £32 billion of 
general government expenditure in 1996-97 as 
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being spent on Scotland's behalf. Of this total, 
around £15 billion would have fallen within the 
responsibility of the Scottish Parliament. Of the 
remainder, around £10 billion was identified as 
being on services incurred directly on Scotland's 
behalf. This expenditure is known as "Identifiable 
Other". As detailed in the Government's "Public 
Expenditure Statistical Analysis", in 1997-98, the 
principal categories were: 
Social Security £9,049 m 
Trade, Industry, Energy 
and Employment £ 280 m 
Roads and Transport £ 177 m 
Agriculture, Fisheries, Food 
and Forestry £ 99 m 
Public expenditure is also incurred on services such 
as Defence and overseas representation which are 
for the benefit of the UK as a whole and cannot be 
attributed to its several parts. This is known as 
"unidentifiable expenditure": an amount of £3.1 
billion was apportioned to Scotland in the GERS 
exercise, largely on the basis of Scotland's 
population share. The principal categories were: 
Defence £1,850 m 
International Devt & other 
International Services £ 290 m 
Miscellaneous* £ 510 m 
*this includes a pro rata share of the UK net 
contribution to the European Communities. 
Note that the amount outwith the control of the 
Scottish Parliament is greater than that within the 
control of the Scottish Parliament. 
Let us look first of all at the information 
requirements as regards identifiable other 
expenditure. The prime requirement is for 
information which will provide the basis for 
efficient articulation between devolved and non-
devolved services. What do we mean by 
articulation and why is it important? To take an 
example, consider the interactions between 
housing, which is a devolved service, and social 
security, which is non-devolved. Despite this split 
of responsibility, housing policy and social security 
policy are intimately linked. Among the clients of 
both services are the same vulnerable social 
groups, of the old, the disabled, the poor and the 
unemployed. Moreover, policy changes in the two 
areas interact. Changes in the regulations on 
housing benefit can have a major effect on the 
whole structure of housing: conversely, a change in 
policy on housing rents can have a significant 
direct impact on the social security budget. Given 
these interactions, it will be vital for the Scottish 
Executive, when developing its policy on housing, 
to seek to ensure that Westminster's policy on 
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social security is moving in a consistent direction, 
and vice versa. 
Similar considerations apply to the links between 
education (devolved), enterprise (part devolved, 
part non-devolved), and social security: between 
the devolved and non-devolved parts of transport: 
etc. 
Good policy articulation depends, in the last resort, 
on Westminster and Holyrood working effectively 
at both political and official level: and how best to 
achieve this goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, the starting point for articulation is the 
availability of the relevant data; so, what data are 
required? 
The first requirement is to know what is spent by 
the different agencies on the different functions, 
but information needs go well beyond this. The key 
to articulation is knowing the characteristics of the 
client groups for the different services, the extent 
of overlap, and critically, their geographical 
location. In an area like Glasgow, it is known that 
68% of local authority tenants receive housing 
benefit and council tax benefit. This bald statistic, 
however, does not tell us why tenants of local 
authority housing in Glasgow are so comparatively 
disadvantaged. To understand this more fully, we 
need to know more about the characteristics of the 
individuals concerned. How many of them are 
unemployed, low income earners, chronically sick, 
old, etc. Only with detailed information like this is 
it possible to identify the problem and then to start 
thinking of the development of an integrated policy 
solution. 
The key to successful policy articulation, therefore, 
is the kind of detailed individual level data which 
can be most readily obtained from a major social 
survey exercise, such as, for example, the new 
Scottish Household Survey currently being 
developed. 
Another vitally important area of identifiable other 
expenditure relates to economic development. 
Currently, under reserved powers, the government 
distributes regional aid within the UK adhering to 
criteria it itself has set down subject to EU rules; 
for example, those areas accorded Assisted Area 
status are determined by criteria which apply at UK 
level and which are set by Westminster within the 
framework of rules determined by the EU. The 
importance to an area of having Assisted Area 
status goes far beyond merely having access to 
regional selective assistance, but also opens the 
door to a variety of means of UK and local 
assistance allowed under EU rules and not 
available to other areas. 
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The EU rules for setting the criteria state that the 
eligibility criteria must be related to data which are 
available for the whole country, that is, the UK. In 
practice, this puts a severe limitation on the 
indicators which can actually be used. One of the 
few indicators readily available at local level is 
unemployment. This may not be the relevant 
measure for Scotland. The composition of industry 
in Scotland, and our exposure to globalisation and 
technological change, may well make us vulnerable 
in a dynamic sense, and this could be better shown 
by indicators other than unemployment. 
There are two implications: 
First, there is a requirement for information other 
than unemployment data at a fairly detailed level 
within Scotland which would enable the Scottish 
Parliament to assess whether there are arguments 
such as economic fragility which would be more 
relevant in determining the distribution of regional 
assistance in Scotland than the traditional 
unemployment measure. If this is the case, and if 
die Scottish Parliament can successfully convince 
Westminster to change the basis upon which RSA 
is determined then the second implication is that 
the required information would need to be 
collected for the UK as a whole. 
Now let us turn to that category of expenditure 
which is referred to as "Unidentified", that is, 
expenditure which is incurred for the benefit of the 
UK as a whole, such as Defence and Overseas 
Representation, and of which a share (basically a 
population share) is attributed to Scotland in the 
GERS exercise. The rationale for this particular 
part of the GERS exercise is that the population of 
the UK as a whole benefits equally from the end 
product of the relevant services: and that it is 
therefore appropriate to allocate the cost of these 
services to the constituent parts of the UK on a 
population basis. This is one way of looking at 
"who benefits". But there are also other ways: we 
would argue that an adequate treatment would 
involve looking at the different ways in which 
different parts of the UK actually do benefit, and 
men forming an overall balanced judgement. In 
particular, the other major way in which an area 
may benefit from unidentified public expenditure is 
from the provision of employment or economic 
multiplier effects which will arise if that 
expenditure is actually incurred within the relevant 
area. In looking at defence expenditure the 
government attempted to make some assessment of 
the incidence of defence employment / expenditure 
in different areas and came to the conclusion that, 
on the basis of the available evidence, the 
incidence of defence expenditure, and therefore the 
relevant multiplier effects in the constituent 
countries of the UK, was unlikely to differ 
significantly from the relevant population shares. 
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There are two respects in which this treatment in 
GERS is inadequate: first, it was based on very 
limited information and did not take adequate 
account, for example, of differences in grade of 
employee and income distribution between areas. 
Secondly, what is important is not just the 
incidence of expenditure but the type of 
expenditure, since a given amount of expenditure 
in the form of high tech defence procurement is 
likely to have a much more profound and 
beneficial effect on the economy of a given area 
than the same amount of expenditure paid out on 
administration or basic procurement. 
What we suggest here is that the Scottish 
Parliament has a legitimate interest in knowing not 
just where non-identifiable expenditure is actually 
incurred but whether this expenditure is incurred in 
ways which generate high value spin offs for 
Scotland. For example, is defence expenditure in 
Scotland resulting in dynamic opportunities for the 
Scottish economy in growth industries? Is 
expenditure on foreign representation generating 
appropriate trade opportunities for Scotland which 
a Scottish Parliament would regard as value for 
money? 
If the answer to either of these two questions is no, 
then the Scottish Parliament would have a 
legitimate interest to lobby Westminster to do 
better on Scotland's behalf. But the first 
requirement is that the Scottish Parliament should 
have available to it the relevant information to 
form the basis for this type of judgement. 
EUROPEAN FUNDING 
It may seem surprising that we have selected 
European funding issues as a topic which requires 
special attention. However, this topic is not only 
important for Scotland, but is cloaked in obscurity. 
As we shall show, special attention to improving 
information in this area should be a priority for the 
Scottish Parliament. 
We begin by describing how the financial 
arrangements with Europe work at the UK level. 
As a member state, the UK makes a gross 
contribution to Europe. This was £8,047 million in 
1998-99, (source: Report of Chancellor of 
Exchequer's Departments), after allowing for the 
UK rebate as negotiated by Mrs. Thatcher. In turn, 
the UK benefited by receiving a total of £4,043 
million in public sector receipts from Europe. 
These took a number of forms, with the major 
categories being: the Common Agricultural Policy, 
£3,026 million; European Social Fund and 
European Regional Development Fund, £963 
million. 
Note that the amount of funding received under 
these programmes and its distribution within the 
UK are not in the UK government's gift. They are 
determined by criteria agreed with Europe, and in 
the case of structural funds, by the quality of the 
projects coming forward. 
Now let us consider these financial arrangements 
as they impact on Scotland. On the contributions 
side, since it is the UK that is the member of the 
European Union, the separate countries within the 
UK have no separately identified individual gross 
contributions. Instead, in working out Scotland's 
fiscal balance in the GERS exercise, the 
government has implicitly assumed that Scotland 
makes a net contribution to Europe, equal to its 
GDP share of the UK net contribution. 
As regards Scotland's receipts of European 
funding, these can be estimated as follows: 
(a) Common Agricultural Expenditure within 
AME. This amounted to £318m in 1999-
2000, (source: Scotland's Supply 
Estimates, 1999-2000): Funding received 
via the Intervention Board for on farm 
payment schemes in Scotland. 
(b) Other European Expenditure within the 
Scottish Budget. This amounted to £ 150m 
in 1999-2000, (source: as above). The 
major components within this total are 
£91m in grants to local authorities and 
other bodies under the European Regional 
Development Fund and £40m in grants to 
local authorities and other bodies under 
the European Social Fund. The balance is 
mainly made up of expenditure on a range 
of agriculture and fisheries structural 
measures. 
(c) European Funded Expenditure not in the 
Scottish Budget. This comes under a 
variety of headings. First of all, there are 
certain elements of expenditure under the 
"identifiable other" category which are 
funded by Europe. The major item here is 
European funded Regional Selective 
Assistance which amounted to £72m in 
1996-97. (Source: Scottish Office). There 
may be other items of European funded 
expenditure as well - for example relating 
to projects funded through the Department 
of Transport, but the relevant figures do 
not appear to be published. Secondly, 
certain European funded expenditure is 
scored in the government's analysis of 
public expenditure as "unidentified": and 
Scotland should therefore be attributed a 
GDP related share of such expenditure. 
Included in this category, for example, is 
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certain European funded BSE related 
expenditure: this amounted to £59 lm for 
the UK as a whole in 1998-99: (source: 
MAFF Departmental Report, Annex 3). 
Accordingly, something over £50 million 
of EU funded expenditure should be 
attributed to Scotland from this source. 
There may also be other items of 
"unidentified" expenditure which are EU 
funded and for which Scotland should be 
allocated a share: the figures do not appear 
to be published to enable these elements to 
be distinguished. 
Overall, therefore, the total of EU funding is of the 
order of £600 million, though for reasons as 
explained above, this figure is an estimated figure 
and may in fact be an underestimate. 
In the light of the above description, the key issues 
for die Scottish Parliament are as follows: 
1. What is the total of European funding which 
should be attributable to Scotland? The annual 
territorial analyses of UK public expenditure 
should be extended to distinguish the European 
funded elements within each of the categories 
of expenditure. This is a particularly important 
point since, as explained below, the amount of 
EU funding attributable to Scotland has a direct 
bearing on Scotland's estimated fiscal deficit. 
2. Does the non-CAP European funding within the 
Scottish Budget actually represent additional 
funding for Scotland? 
At first sight, the answer to this question 
appears self evident: of course Scotland is 
better off because of the non-CAP European 
funding it receives within the Scottish budget. 
However, careful examination of the published 
Scottish estimates suggests that the answer to 
this question is by no means so clear cut. On the 
one hand, Note 2.4.2 of Scotland's Supply 
Estimates for 1999-2000 states that 
"There is provision in the Estimates which is 
not included in the total budget for Scotland for 
control purposes. For instance, the Estimates 
include receipts from the European 
Communities, expenditure on NHS and 
teachers' superannuation and receipts from the 
National Insurance Fund towards the costs of 
the NHS in Scotland. " 
A reasonable interpretation of this note would 
be that receipts from the European 
Communities are not included in the total 
Scottish budget for control purposes, and hence 
that European receipts in the Scottish budget 
would be over and above the DEL element of 
the budget, as determined by the Barnett 
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formula. However, comparison of the DEL 
figures in Chart 2.2 and Table 2.1 of the 
Estimates volume indicates that £150 million of 
non-CAP European receipts is subtracted from 
the DEL figure as determined by Bamett in 
working out the financial provision in the 
estimates. This suggests that this element of 
European funding is not actually additional to 
what would have been provided anyway by way 
of Bamett unless the original DEL figures had 
been adjusted upwards at some point in the past 
by the anticipated future stream of European 
receipts in Scotland. It does not appear to be 
possible to establish from published sources 
whether such an adjustment or adjustments 
were ever made to the Scottish DEL. The 
government should be pressed for a clear and 
unambiguous answer to this point. But if the 
answer is that no historical adjustment was 
made to the DEL, then the implication is that 
Scotland has failed to benefit from elements of 
EU funding which it should have received: this 
would be in clear breach of the stated EU 
principle that such funding should be 
additional. 
3. What is the impact of European funding on 
Scotland's fiscal balance? 
In working out Scotland's fiscal balance in the 
GERS exercise, the government has implicidy 
assumed that Scotland makes a net contribution 
to Europe, equal to its population share of the 
UK net contribution. For the reasons which are 
discussed in detail in Cuthbert and Cuthbert 
[1998], this is an untenable position which has 
the consequences that (a) Scotland's assessed 
fiscal deficit is overstated and (b) that 
Scotland's deficit increases the more European 
funding Scotland attracts. 
It will be an important issue for the Scottish 
Parliament to ensure that a more satisfactory 
methodology is adopted in any future GERS 
type exercise. The appropriate approach would 
be to include, on the expenditure side of the 
account, Scotland's population share of the 
gross UK contribution: but also to credit, as 
negative expenditure, the full amount of 
European receipts attributable to Scotland. As 
already noted, this means that the correct 
estimation of EU funding attributable to 
Scotland has a direct bearing on Scotland's 
estimated fiscal deficit. 
WIDER ISSUES 
The primary concern of this paper is wim the 
immediate monitoring issues posed by the 
devolution setdement. There are, in addition, two 
wider issues which will inevitably become the 
focus of considerable attention in the medium term. 
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The first issue is the topic of relative spending 
needs between Scotland and England. The 
principle which was enunciated in the Treasury led 
study on relative spending needs published at the 
time of the original devolution proposals in 1979 
was as follows: 
"It is a long established principle that all areas of 
the United Kingdom are entitled to broadly the 
same level of public services, and that the 
expenditure on them should be allocated according 
to their relative needs." 
Reference, HM Treasury, 1979. 
The question of what level of expenditure is 
"needed" in Scotland relative to England, is not 
explicitly addressed in today's devolution 
settlement. A reasonable interpretation of the 
decision to use the Barnett formula as the basis for 
determining changes in the Scottish DEL, (with the 
consequent implication of likely long term 
convergence in per capita spending levels), would 
be that the government has an implicit view that 
the long term level of per capita need in Scotland is 
the same as that in England. However, if this were 
the government's position, it would be one that is 
difficult to defend, particularly in the light of the 
above Treasury study which concluded that a level 
of per capita spending in Scotland 16% higher than 
that in England might be needed. Of course, that 
study is now very out of date, and in any event was 
based on a fairly crude methodology. Nevertheless, 
without undertaking a substantive new study, it 
would be difficult for the government to seriously 
advance die position that they now had any better 
specific estimate of relative levels of need. 
A more reasonable interpretation of the 
government's position might be mat they take the 
view that the current per capita spending levels in 
Scotland are somewhat above the level implied by 
relative need, (hence the decision to impose the 
convergence implied by Barnett), but that it is not 
possible to say by how much. However, this 
position is not tenable in the longer term. At some 
point, the squeeze implied by Bamett will lead 
relative spending in Scotland to fall below some 
general perception of what is needed. This will 
happen in particular if Barnett implies the necessity 
for real cuts in public expenditure in Scotland, 
which could easily happen either given a 
combination of high inflation and low real growth 
in public expenditure at UK level, or if resources 
were to be pre-empted by national pay awards to 
major groups. At that point, the issue of needs will 
emerge as a matter of public controversy and it will 
be necessary for the government to attempt some 
new needs study, whose findings would have to 
command widespread respect. 
The second issue concerns the need to improve 
data on the key macro economic aggregates for 
Scotland. The success of the Scottish economy is 
such an important issue that good economic data 
will be needed in order to maximise die impact of 
the economic measures which the Scottish 
Executive can take. In particular, what is required 
includes an appreciation of the key engines in 
Scottish economic performance, how they are 
influenced by economic events, and therefore what 
strategies ought best to be adopted by the Scottish 
Executive to assist long term economic 
performance. 
Moreover, the inherent instability of the devolution 
arrangements will itself pose a requirement for 
better macro-economic data. This is so, because as 
we have already argued, the question of relative 
spending need will inevitably become a live issue, 
and the Scottish Parliament and the Westminster 
government will men become involved in what will 
essentially become a negotiation about reopening 
the devolution financial settlement. It seems 
inescapable that this negotiation will involve claim 
and counter claim about the extent to which 
Scodand pays its way as regards its public sector 
finances. In other words, the issue of Scotland's 
fiscal balance will again become of key 
importance. 
As noted earlier, successive governments have 
found it appropriate to publish estimates of 
Scodand's fiscal balance in the annual GERS 
exercise: however, the methodology employed, and 
the quality of the data sources, are far from 
satisfactory - (Cuthbert and Cuthbert, 1998). It will 
be important for all concerned, but particularly for 
the Scottish Executive, which stands to be 
disadvantaged if the current unsatisfactory GERS 
memodology is not improved, that better estimates 
of Scodand's fiscal balance are available. 
CONCLUSION 
There are a number of important issues, affecting 
many aspects of the devolution settlement, which 
will require to be actively monitored and on which 
it will be necessary for appropriate data sources to 
be developed. If this monitoring is not undertaken 
then the consequences could be severe, bodi for the 
success of devolution itself and die long term 
welfare of Scodand. 
The specific needs identified in diis paper are as 
follows: 
• full information required to monitor die 
operation of me Bamett formula; 
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• the information required to monitor the implicit 
assumptions on "own resources" underlying the 
devolution settlement; 
• the information required to ensure proper 
articulation of devolved and non-devolved 
services; 
• indicators of the value for money yielded by 
unidentified public expenditure 
• better information on various aspects of 
European funding 
• as regards the wider issues discussed in the final 
section of the paper, it will be required to 
develop an appropriate methodology on needs 
assessment, and improved macro economic 
data. 
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